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While it seems hard to deny the epistemic significance of a disagreement with our 
acknowledged epistemic peers, there are certain disagreements, such as philosophical 
disagreements, which appear to be permissibly sustainable. These two claims, each 
independently plausible, are jointly puzzling. This paper argues for a solution to this puzzle. 
The main tenets of the solution are two. First, the peers ought to engage into a deliberative 
activity of discovering more about their epistemic position vis-à-vis the issue at stake. 
Secondly, the peers are permitted to do so while entertaining a sui generis doxastic attitude of 
hypothesis. 
 
1 The Puzzle of Peer Disagreement 
 
What ought we do when we discover a disagreement with an acknowledged epistemic peer, 
that is, somebody who is as well positioned epistemically as we are with respect to the matter 
at hand?1 Call this The Question. 
In this paper I set out to present and solve a specific puzzle which emerges from The 
Question. The puzzle is fuelled by two apparently compelling yet opposite intuitions. The first 
intuition is elicited by cases such as the following, due to David Christensen (2007): 
 
(RESTAURANT) 
Allison is dining with her friend Marc. They’ve been going out to dinner together 
regularly over the past several years. Most of the time they’ve calculated their 
respective shares of the bill, they’ve been right equally often. Tonight, after having 
looked at the bill, Allison asserts with confidence that she has carefully calculated 
in her head that they each owe $43, while Marc says with the same degree of 
confidence that he has calculated in his head that they each owe $45. 
																																																								
1 See e.g. Kelly (2005) and Elga (2007) for different definitions of epistemic parity. In this paper I can afford to 
remain neutral on what the correct definition is. 
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It seems plausible to say here that Allison and Marc ought not retain their original doxastic 
attitudes. After all, they cannot simply ignore the fact that somebody who they 
acknowledge to be as well positioned epistemically as they are has reached an opposite 
verdict about the bill. Nor can they disregard their opposite number’s opinion simply on 
the basis of the fact that he or she disagrees with them, for that would be exceedingly 
dogmatic. Call this the Conformist Intuition. 
Surely there is something attractive about the Conformist Intuition. It’s no accident 
that much of the debate about peer disagreement has revolved around various ways of 
developing answers to The Question which are motivated by the Conformist Intuition. These 
are called conciliatory or equal weight views of peer disagreement (see e.g. Christensen 2007, 
2011, Elga 2007, Feldman 2006). 
However, other peer disagreement cases elicit an opposite intuition. Take the 
following: 
 
(A PRIORI)  
Rudy and Ruth are two philosophers interested in whether there’s a meaningful 
distinction between a priori and a posteriori justification. They regard themselves as 
equally thoughtful, sophisticated and careful philosophers accessing the same 
body of evidence on this question. Rudy believes in the existence of the 
distinction, whereas Ruth does not. 
 
According to what I shall call the Non-Conformist Intuition, Rudy and Ruth are permitted not 
to revise their respective opinions. The Non-Conformist Intuition can be supported by 
various considerations. For one thing, one form of philosophical progress is the 
development of full-fledged competing theories of a given subject matter. Constant 
revision of our ideas in the face of disagreement with a philosophical peer would put a 
leash on this form of progress. For another, philosophical discourse is much more tied to 
understanding than mental calculation is. Plausibly, understanding requires that we figure 
things out by ourselves by responding directly to the evidence and the philosophically 
relevant features of a given question. Therefore it seems legitimate not to assign too much 
extra epistemic weight – that is, the kind of weight which could mandate revision of our 
philosophical opinions – to a view just because one of our peers defends it. 
Despite their initial individual plausibility, however, a joint theoretical articulation of 
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the Conformist Intuition and the Non-Conformist Intuition seems to give rise to a puzzle. 
To illustrate. 
On a somewhat natural way of expanding on the Conformist Intuition, the fact that 
one is in disagreement with an acknowledged peer constitutes evidence that somebody has 
made a mistake; and one has no reason to think that it’s one’s peer who has made it rather 
than oneself. This rational doubt seems to require that one change one’s view about the 
matter at issue. And yet, the Non-Conformist Intuition apparently calls for a response at 
the opposite end of the spectrum, to the effect that peers are permitted not to change their 
views. 
In light of this, if we subscribe to both the Conformist Intuition and the Non-
Conformist Intuition, it seems that we are also committed to the following almost 
paradoxical claims:2 
 
(a) Whenever you discover a disagreement with an acknowledged peer, you 
thereby gain evidence that you have made a mistake. 
(b) Whenever you have evidence that you have made a mistake, you ought to 
change your view about the matter at hand. 
Therefore: 
(c) Whenever you discover a disagreement with an acknowledged peer, you 
ought to change your view about the matter at hand. 
And yet: 
(d) Sometimes, when you discover a disagreement with an acknowledged peer, 
you are permitted not to change your view about the matter at hand. 
 
Call this The Puzzle. I submit that any satisfactory answer to The Question has to be able to 
solve The Puzzle. 
In this paper I offer an answer to The Question which provides a solution to The Puzzle. 
I will proceed as follows. In section 2 I articulate my answer to The Question. In section 3 I 
show how it solves The Puzzle. 
  
2 The Answer to the Question: Re-Opening and Hypothesising  
 
My answer to The Question, which I shall dub The Answer, consists of the following claims. 
																																																								
2See also Everett (2015: 275). 
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First, after the discovery of their disagreement, the peers ought to re-open the question whether p.3 
Second, while under the requirement to re-open the question, the peers are permitted to 
revise their attitudes in only two ways: by suspending judgement or by hypothesising. Third, the 
peers are not permitted to retain their previous doxastic attitudes. Let me articulate these claims 
in turn. 
 
2.1 Re-Opening the Question 
 
To re-open the question whether a given proposition p is true is to perform certain tasks, 
such as going over the shared body of evidence by re-evaluating its extension (i.e. whether a 
given item counts as a piece of evidence or not), carefully re-assessing its probative force, 
double-checking the reasoning by means of which one put all the evidential items together to 
get to a conclusion about its support for a specific attitude, and making sure that one’s 
general epistemic and cognitive conditions were normal. Alternatively, re-opening the 
question whether p may require  looking for new evidence and arguments in order to come 
to a verdict about p’s truth-value. 
Re-opening the question of the truth of p is, I contend, a cognitive and deliberative 
activity whose aim is to find out more about p’s truth-value by re-assessing the whole 
epistemic situation one is in and, if necessary, improving one’s epistemic situation by looking 
for new evidence, information, or methods of investigation. This reassessment of one’s 
evidence, reasoning, and epistemic credentials puts one in a position to unmask misleading 
ways of weighing certain evidential items, the insufficiency of the present body of evidence, 
and/or the need to look for new evidential items, a flaw in the reasoning from evidence to 
doxastic attitude, a deficient general epistemic status (e.g. the presence of some bias which 
impaired one’s judgment), and so on and so forth. 
In light of this, it is plausible to take re-opening the question whether p to be a truth-
promoting activity. Suppose that during the re-opening activity one discovers that one has 
mistakenly assessed the probative force of some evidential item by taking it to speak in 
favour of p’s falsity rather than its truth. Or suppose that one discovers that one has 
mistakenly taken an item i to be a piece of evidence concerning the matter at hand when it is 
not. Plausibly, uncovering such mistakes is conducive to improving one’s epistemic position 
vis-à-vis getting p’s truth-value right. 
As far as I can see, The Question asks us to propose a normative epistemic requirement 
																																																								
3 Some of the terminology I will employ is borrowed from Shah and Velleman (2005). 
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which tells peers what to do when they discover their disagreement. Since the doing I am 
recommending here – i.e. re-opening the question whether p – is epistemic in character in 
virtue of its truth-promoting nature, the claim that peers ought to respond to their 
disagreement by re-opening the question in this way seems to engage with The Question at the 
right epistemic level. 
I take this to be a fairly natural way of responding to peer disagreement. Yet natural 
though it is, it has not previously been defended. Indeed, closer inspection reveals that the 
requirement that peers re-open the question is inconsistent both with the requirement that 
they revise and with the permission that they retain their initial doxastic attitudes, once a 
narrow yet very common interpretation of doxastic revision is adopted. If this is right, then the claim that 
peers ought to respond to their disagreement by re-opening the question of the truth of the 
contested proposition provides a substantively new way of answering The Question. 
The widespread yet – I believe – unduly narrow conception of doxastic revision which 
I will adopt for purposes of this section is the following. One revises one’s attitude toward p, 
in the narrow sense that I intend, if and only if one believes (or—mutatis mutandis—
disbelieves, or assigns a certain credence to) p at t0 and one disbelieves (or—mutatis 
mutandis—believes, or assigns a higher or lower credence to) p at t1. As for the corresponding 
narrow notion of doxastic retention, let us say that one retains one’s attitude toward p if and 
only if one believes (or disbelieves, or assigns a certain credence to) p at t0 and one believes 
(or disbelieves, or assigns the same credence to) p at t1. I will label these “revisen” and 
“retainn” respectively, clarifying later why I take them to represent a particularly “narrow” 
conception of doxastic revision and retention. 
To show that the requirement to re-open the question whether p is inconsistent both 
with the permission to retain one’s original doxastic attitude and with the requirement to 
revise it, provided that revision and retention are understood as per the above, I will 
introduce the notion of taking the question whether p to be settled. I will then propose four 
principles exposing the normative connections among re-opening the question whether p, 
retainingn and revisingn one’s doxastic attitude toward p, and taking the question whether p to 
be settled. 
The notion of ‘taking the question whether p to be settled’ does not imply that one 
knows the answer to the target question, nor is it factive (in the sense of entailing that the 
question is settled). Rather, taking the question whether p to be settled is always relative to 
one’s own epistemic position: one takes the question whether p to be settled in a given way 
or in another – e.g. one takes the question whether p to be settled in the affirmative rather 
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than in the negative – given the evidence, epistemic facts and reasoning powers available to 
one. Thus, if one’s body of evidence at t is such that  – defeasibly and perhaps misleadingly – 
it makes it the case that there’s a 70% chance that Alice will be eating cheese for lunch, it 
seems that one can – and is permitted to – close inquiry into the question of what Alice will 
eat for lunch by being .7 confident that she’ll be eating cheese. Should one acquire new 
countervailing evidence, one would (if rational) re-open the question and assess the 
probative force of the new evidence. 
Let me first set out the normative connections among re-opening, retainingn and taking 
the question to be settled.4 Here they are (understanding all oughts and permissions as 
epistemic): 
 
PR1: If one ought to re-open the question whether p, then one ought not take the 
question whether p to be settled. 
 
PR2: If one is permitted to retainn one’s initial attitude towards p, then one is permitted 
to take the question whether p to be settled. 
 
I take both principles to be extremely plausible. The justification for PR1 is the following. 
Intuitively, re-opening the question of p’s truth-value while at the same time taking that 
question to be settled comes very close to taking a question to be and not be settled at the 
same time. So, making use of the plausible principle that when you ought to believe that p 
you ought not disbelieve it, when you ought to re-open the question whether p you ought 
not take the question whether p to be settled. To be sure, I do not deny that one might be 
under an obligation to pursue the re-opening activity for prudential or moral reasons, even in 
the case in which one is certain of the answer to the question (suppose that a billionaire 
would invest billions of dollars in famine relief if you did so), and it might also well be the 
case that prudential and moral obligations trump epistemic ones. Yet since PR1 is about 
epistemic requirements only, these considerations do not affect its plausibility. 
PR2 is formulated in terms of permission, since steadfast views of peer disagreement 
are usually understood as claiming that one is permitted – as opposed to required – to retain 
one’s doxastic attitude in the face of disagreement with an epistemic peer. PR2 is plausible 
because if one is permitted to retain one’s belief that p, this means that one continues to have 
epistemic reasons – relative to one’s epistemic position and however defeasible and 
																																																								
4 I am indebted to Sven Rosenkranz here. 
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misleading they might be – to take the question of p’s truth-value to be settled in the 
affirmative. A fortiori, then, one is permitted to take the question whether p to be settled. 
I should emphasise that PR1 and PR2 hold whether we take doxastic attitudes to be 
full or graded. Within the quantitative framework of degrees of confidence, it does not make 
sense to speak of taking the question of p’s truth-value to be settled altogether. Such a 
question can be taken to be settled to a certain (maximal, minimal, or intermediate) degree. 
So when stated for credences, PR1 does not require that one take the question whether p to 
be settled to the maximal degree. This is clearly compatible with how we have characterized 
the notion of taking the question whether p to be settled, for this notion is not factive and is 
to be understood as relativised to one’s epistemic position vis-à-vis p. Thus if one’s evidence 
is such that it supports – however defeasibly and misleadingly  – taking the question to be 
settled to a given degree, then one is permitted so to take it. It is therefore plausible to say, as 
PR2 does, that if you are permitted to retain your .2 degree of confidence toward p, this 
means that your epistemic situation continues to allow you to take the question whether p to 
be settled to a certain degree. 
Let us now turn to the normative connections among re-opening, revisingn and taking 
the question to be settled.  Let us first adopt the following: 
 
PR3: If one ought to take the question whether p to be settled, then one ought not re-
open the question whether p. 
 
PR3 is made plausible by the same line of reasoning that supports PR1.  
We need a final principle which bears the same relation to conciliatory views that PR2 
bears to steadfast views. Since conciliatory views are usually taken to specify a requirement 
and not a permission concerning how to respond to peer disagreement, such a principle will 
take the following form: 
 
PR4: If one ought to revisen one’s attitude toward p, then one ought to take the question 
whether p to be settled. 
 
Here is the rationale for PR4. Suppose that one ought to revisen one’s attitude toward p. One 
ought to revise one’s degree of confidence toward p from .2, say, to .6. Now suppose for 
reductio, however, that (contrary to PR4) it is decidedly not the case that one ought to take 
the question whether p to be settled. Plausibly, though, if one ought not take the question 
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whether p to be settled to a certain degree, for instance to degree .6, then there is some (no 
matter how defeasible and misleading) reason against taking the question of p’s truth-value to 
be settled to that degree. But if one has some such reason, it seems that one has a defeater 
for revising one’s doxastic attitude toward p from .2 to .6. And in the presence of such a 
defeater, it cannot be said that one is still required to revise from .2 to .6. But this contradicts 
our original supposition. 
Let us now assume the plausible principle that what is required is also permitted and 
adopt the following abbreviations: 
Reo p = re-opening the question whether p 
Ret p = retainingn one’s previous attitude towards p 
Set p = taking the question whether p to be settled 
O = Requirement/ought operator 
P = Permission operator (¬O¬) 
D = ¬(Oφ ∧O¬φ) 
 
We can now run the following arguments: 
 
Inconsistency of being required to re-open and permitted to retainn: 
(1) O (Reo p)     (Ass1) 
(2) P (Ret p)     (Ass2) 
(3) (O Reo p → O ¬Set p)    (PR1)     
(4) (P Ret p → P Set p)    (PR2) 
(5) O (¬Set p)     (1, 3 MP) 
(6) P (Set p)     (2, 4 MP) 
(7) O (¬Set p) ∧ P (Set p)    (5, 6, ∧-intro.) 
(8) ⊥      (7, definition of P) 
 
Inconsistency of being required to re-open and required to revisen: 
(1) O (Reo p)     (Ass1) 
(2) O (Rev p)     (Ass3) 
(3) (O Set p → O ¬Reo p)    (PR3) 
(4) (O Rev p → O Set p)    (PR4) 
(5) O (Set p)     (2, 4 MP) 
(6) O (¬Reo p)     (3, 5, MP) 
(7) O (Reo p) ∧ O (¬Reo p)   (1, 6, ∧-intro.) 
(8) ⊥      (7, D) 
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The foregoing discussion shows that requiring peers to re-open the question whether p is 
inconsistent with both conciliatory views (such as the ones defended by Christensen and 
Elga and steadfast views of peer disagreement (see Wedgwood 2010, Weintraub 2013) and is 
a substantively new way of answering The Question. 
However, it is time now to go back to the claim that I have so far been operating with 
what I have called a “narrow” notion of doxastic revision. Its narrowness stems from two 
factors. First, it takes into account only revising one’s belief into a disbelief (or vice versa), or 
revising one’s credence cr into another credence cr*. Secondly, it obeys PR4. Yet I believe 
that we can envisage a wider notion of doxastic revision which (unlike revisionn) is 
normatively compatible with being required to re-open the question whether p. 
Given what PR1 and PR3 rule out, we are after a kind of revision from a belief (or a 
disbelief or a degree of confidence) to a type of attitude such that it is permissible to 
entertain that attitude without taking the question whether p to be settled. In the next 
(sub)section I argue that there are in fact two distinct types of doxastic attitude that meet this 
constraint.5 
 
2.2 The Attitude of Suspended Judgement and the Attitude of Hypothesis 
 
The first type of attitude I want to focus on is the attitude of suspended judgement. More 
specifically, I want to focus on a specific notion of suspended judgement recently defended 
by Jane Friedman (2013, 2017). 
According to Friedman, the attitude of suspended judgement cannot be plausibly 
reduced to more familiar doxastic attitudes (see especially Friedman 2013). Rather, 
suspended judgement is a sui generis non-propositional question-directed attitude of epistemic 
neutrality which one entertains while inquiring into some matter. Suspended judgement, on 
Friedman’s view, is the attitude we entertain while we aim to find the answer to a question. 
For this reason, it comes with “a sort of orientation towards or sensitivity to information 
that bears on the focal question, and perhaps some other related sorts of dispositions to 
come to know things that will help one close that question” (Friedman 2017: 305). 
In light of the kind of role that this attitude of suspended judgement plays within our 
mental architecture, it is rationally permissible to suspend judgement in a wide range of 
																																																								
5 Recognizing these doxastic attitudes will necessitate a broadening of our conception of doxastic retention in 
parallel with that of doxastic revision. 
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circumstances, for instance when one is curious about a question Q, wants to resolve Q, and 
so on. (see also Friedman 2017: 321).6 
I submit that there is no inconsistency in having an attitude of suspended judgement 
about whether p while under a requirement to re-open the question whether p. To see why, 
let us look at a kind of counterpart of PR4, but for suspended judgement and formulated in 
terms of permission. 
 
PR4*: If one is permitted to revise one’s attitude toward p by suspending judgement, then 
one is required to take the question whether p to be settled.  
 
PR4* is implausible, in that suspended judgement is exactly the type of doxastic attitude one 
is permitted to entertain while taking the question whether p to be still open. Thus we cannot 
run the earlier inconsistency argument. It is permissible, then, for one to suspend judgement 
while at the same time being under a requirement to re-open the question whether p. 
That being said, I believe a compelling case can be made in favour of the existence of a 
doxastic attitude which I shall call the attitude of hypothesis. This attitude—unlike suspended 
judgement, but like belief—is propositional, but, like suspended judgement, it is one which 
we entertain while we are still inquiring into p’s truth-value. 
To begin with, notice that when we commence inquiry into p’s truth-value, it makes 
sense to say that we are epistemically neutral toward whether it is true or false. This attitude 
of neutrality is captured by Friedman’s notion of suspended judgement. It is also equally 
plausible to take an inquirer to close her inquiry into whether p is true or false by believing 
that p (or by being confident to a certain degree in the truth of p). This happens, for instance, 
when the inquirer manages to find enough evidence and reasons to close the question in 
given way, for instance in the affirmative. Yet there is also a third possibility, to the effect 
that the inquirer has gathered some evidence, deliberated for a while about p, and now 
moves from being suspended about its truth-value to a less neutral state of mind toward p’s 
																																																								
6 I should add that there is a different usage of the label ‘suspended judgement’ (or ‘agnosticism’) on which it 
instead picks out our epistemic inability to determine whether a given proposition is true or false. Rosenkranz 
(2007) offers a characterisation of this kind of epistemic neutrality, which he dubs “True Agnosticism”. True 
Agnosticism is the stance we adopt when we are not in a position to know the truth-value of a proposition and 
will continue not to know it relative to all states of information we can reach by expanding current methods of 
inquiry and cognitive powers. This kind of epistemic neutrality is very different from what Friedman means by 
suspended judgement, for it amounts to having reached a view and closed the inquiry, albeit in neither the 
affirmative nor the negative, but, rather, in a neutral way. 
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truth-value which does not yet qualify as a belief state. The scenario I am envisaging is one in 
which, even though the inquirer is not yet ready to believe/disbelieve p, she is nonetheless 
cognitively inclined toward p, while still however taking the question whether p to be open. 
This is the attitude we entertain when we currently take p to be the most promising way of 
closing the question whether p or not-p, without having already taken the question whether p 
or not-p to be closed. This intermediate attitude between suspended judgement and belief (or 
credence) is what I call ‘hypothesis’. 
I will now theoretically substantiate the existence of such an intermediate type of 
doxastic attitude by contrasting it with other doxastic attitudes in the vicinity, such as 
suspended judgement, belief, supposition, and credence. More details are called for than I 
can provide in this discussion, but I trust that the following remarks will suffice for purposes 
of this paper.7 
As has emerged previously, suspended judgement is a doxastic attitude we entertain 
when we open the inquiry into p’s truth-value and which manifests our open-mindedness to 
the possibility that different candidate answers, say that p is true or that p is false, are equally 
epistemically good answers to the question of what p’s truth-value is. This attitude involves 
inquiry-oriented dispositions to collect evidence and information and to be sensitive to 
anything which can speak in favour either of p or of its falsity (see Friedman 2017). 
Hypothesis, unlike suspended judgement, is the doxastic attitude one entertains 
towards p when one is inclined toward an affirmative stance on the question whether p is 
true as the most promising way of answering this question.8 This attitude involves focused 
inquisitive dispositions, such as being disposed to: make more effort to check whether the 
probative force of evidence is in favour of the truth rather than the falsity of p, to check 
whether the truth of p (rather than its falsity) coheres with other already accepted truths in 
the vicinity, and so on. In contrast to suspended judgment, hypothesis is asymmetrical between 
p and not-p. 
To turn now to belief, it is the attitude whereby we close the question whether a given 
proposition is true or false. By believing that p, we close the question of p’s truth-value in the 
affirmative. This involves very different dispositions from those involved in suspending 
																																																								
7 In a companion piece (Palmira ms.), I argue at greater length that hypothesis is a sui generis doxastic attitude. 
8 There are in fact various ways of what I might call holding p which do not entail taking the question whether p 
to be settled (nor do they entail hypothesising that p). By “holding” p I simply mean that the relevant doxastic 
attitudes are favourable, are asymmetrical between p and not-p, and have propositions as contents. 
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judgement. It is often claimed that when one believes that p, one is disposed to use p as a 
premise in theoretical and practical reasoning, and to assert that p. 
By contrast, when one hypothesises that p, one is not disposed to assert p. By way of 
illustration, let us assume that assertion is the kind of speech act one performs when one 
(overtly) undertakes a commitment to authorise the hearer to assert p and all that logically 
follows from it, to take up the challenge of vindicating the assertion by offering 
considerations that justify it, and to retract it if certain conditions are met (see MacFarlane 
2011 for discussion). It seems that if one is merely inclined to take p to be the most 
promising answer to a question one will not recommend to others to assert p, for one is still 
in the process of establishing whether p really is the answer to the question. Moreover, the 
very idea of vindicating one’s assertion that p seems to obey the following pattern: we’ve 
made up our mind about the matter at stake, somebody challenges us about p, and we 
rehearse our reasons for p or come up with new ones. Thus, one vindicates one’s assertion 
after one has made up one’s mind about the topic at stake. However, when one hypothesises 
that p one has not yet made up one’s mind about p. So when one hypothesises that p one can 
be taken to be disposed to perform a different speech act that we may call, following the lead 
of Williamson (2000: chapter 11), ‘conjecturing p’.  
Let me now distinguish the attitude of hypothesis from the attitude of supposition (or 
assuming p for the sake of argument). I submit that supposing p differs from hypothesising p 
in that the latter is a cognitive pro-attitude whereas the former is not. That is to say, if one 
hypothesises that p one regards p favourably from an epistemic point of view, but this is not 
the case with supposing. We can suppose that p in a reductio argument in order to show that p 
is false, precisely because we have a cognitive inclination toward not-p. Or we can suppose p 
just for the sake of conversation, to enable our conversational partner to carry out her 
reasoning; clearly, doing so doesn’t mean that one is inclined toward p in any sense. 
Finally, let me outline the main difference between hypothesis and credences. Since I 
have argued that one can take the question whether p to be settled by assigning a credence to 
p, I believe that credences can play the role that full belief plays, in that they are attitudes 
whereby we can (rationally) close inquiries. This contention is reinforced by the idea that 
credences, just like full belief, can constitute knowledge,9 whereas hypothesis, as an attitude 
we have precisely when the inquiry is open and we do not know whether p is true or false, 
cannot constitute knowledge. 
																																																								
9 See Moss (2013).	
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Let me also say something about the normative profile of hypothesis. I take this 
attitude to be governed by the following norm: 
 
(H-Norm) 
For all p, one is permitted to hypothesize that p if and only if holding p enables one to 
make reliable progress with the inquiry into p being the answer to the question of p’s 
truth-value. 
 
The right-to-left side of (H-Norm) says that if holding p enables one to make reliable 
progress with the inquiry into the question of whether p’s truth is the answer to the question 
of whether p is true or false, we may hypothesise p. The left-to-right side of (H-Norm) says 
that if holding p as true is not conducive to making reliable progress into discovering 
whether or not p is the answer to the question of p’s truth-value, then we ought not to 
hypothesise p.  
A couple of clarifications are in order. First, (H-Norm) does not require that one 
believes that progress will be made. Thus, if one thinks that no progress toward the truth of a 
given question, for instance the question of whether or not there is free will, can ever be 
made but is still cognitively inclined towards compatibilism, one is not ipso facto an irrational 
hypothesiser. Secondly, imposing a reliability condition on inquisitive progress yields the 
intuitively correct verdict of irrationality in cases where hypothezizers make progress with the 
inquiry into p being the answer to the question of p’s truth-value by sheer luck through 
motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, and similarly vicious reasoning methods. The 
foregoing discussion establishes that requiring peers to revise their original doxastic attitudes 
by turning them into attitudes of hypothesis is compatible with permitting peers to re-open 
the question whether p. For if they were incompatible the following principle would be 
plausible: 
 
PR4**: If one is permitted to revise one’s attitude toward p by hypothesising that p, then 
one is required to take the question whether p to be settled. 
 
PR4** is implausible, though, for the same reason that PR4* was. I have argued that the 
attitude of hypothesis is – together with suspended judgement – precisely the attitude one 
may entertain when one takes the question whether p to still be open. So, since PR4** does 
not hold for hypothesis, we cannot mount an argument for the inconsistency of requiring 
	 14	
peers to re-open the question while permitting them to entertain attitudes of hypothesis. 
This completes my defence of The Answer. To repeat it. Whenever you disagree with an 
acknowledged epistemic peer about whether p, you ought to re-open the question whether p, 
and you are permitted to revise your initial doxastic attitude toward p in one of two ways: by 
suspending judgement or by hypothesising. These two types of revision differ from more 
common types of revision in that one may perform them while taking the question whether 
p not to be settled. We can add that you are not permitted to retain your original doxastic 
attitude in the face of such a disagreement—conciliationists are right at least to this extent.  
In the remainder of the paper I explain how The Answer solves The Puzzle. 
 
3 Solving the Puzzle  
 
I will first examine how The Answer deals with the two cases motivating the Conformist and 
Non-Conformist Intuitions. Secondly, I will show that the Answer affords the means to 
what I shall call The Uniform Solution to The Puzzle. 
 
3.1 The Answer at Work 
 
It is important to bear in mind that re-opening the question whether p is an activity whose 
aim is to enable one to find out more about p’s truth-value by re-checking whether its truth 
(or falsity) is supported by the available body of evidence, whether new evidence is needed to 
adjudicate the question, whether the reasoning from evidence to a belief can be deductive or 
not, and so on. While engaged in these tasks, peers are permitted either to be suspended or 
to entertain an attitude of hypothesis toward either p or not-p. However, if peers achieve the 
aim of the re-opening activity, e.g. they reach the verdict that p is true and well supported by 
the available evidence and, say, one of the peers had mistakenly interpreted the probative 
force of the evidence, they have most reason to bring the re-opening activity to a close. 
Depending on the outcome of the activity, viz. depending on how the aim of re-opening the 
question has been achieved, they ought either to believe that p or disbelieve that p (or have 
the degree of confidence that is epistemically supported by the evidence which bears on the 
matter at hand). 
This points to the fact that The Answer recommends a dynamic rather than a static way of 
responding to peer disagreement. Peers are permitted to entertain attitudes of hypothesis or 
an attitude of suspended judgement during the re-opening activity only. If they manage to 
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satisfy the aim of the re-opening activity, they find out whether p is true or has a favourable 
epistemic status, and they should then pass out of these attitudes. While the way in which the 
aim of the re-opening activity is achieved might vary across cases, for sometimes one finds 
out that p is true, sometimes that it is false, sometimes that we cannot say anything about its 
truth-value, achieving this aim enables peers to determine what to believe. To illustrate this 
point, take (RESTAURANT). Allison and Marc ought to go over the present body of 
evidence (e.g. by rechecking the price of each course on the menu) and, if they still disagree, 
look for new evidence (e.g. recalculating the tip carefully with a calculator, checking whether 
there is a cover charge to pay, and so on) to settle the question. This re-opening activity will 
enable them to discover who got it right (if either of them did). Assume that Allison got it 
right. That is to say, the proposition that they each owe $43 is true and supported by the 
evidence. If so, then the outcome of the re-opening activity gives her reasons to demote 
Marc’s epistemic credentials and stick to her guns. In light of the re-opening activity, Marc 
acquires reasons not to believe that they each owe $45. 
However, there might be disagreement cases in which the re-opening activity fails to 
yield a clear and conclusive outcome such that its aim can be regarded as achieved. In such 
cases, peers do not have any (epistemic) reason to bring the re-opening activity to a close by 
determining that they ought to have a certain belief towards the contested proposition. 
I contend that (A PRIORI) might plausibly be regarded as an instance of such cases. 
Even after reconsidering the question whether there is a meaningful distinction between a 
priori and a posteriori justification for a long time and with great attention, it will be far from 
clear who as between Rudy and Ruth is making a mistake about such an issue; what the 
relevant body of evidence bearing on it is and how to assess the probative force of each 
alleged piece of evidence; whether Rudy and Ruth rely on incommensurable yet equally 
objectively valuable general philosophical principles; whether they use the concepts of A 
PRIORI and A POSTERIORI in slightly different ways; and so on and so forth. 
The Answer maintains that peers involved in such complex disagreements ought to keep 
on inquiring into the question by canvassing and improving their respective epistemic 
positions, looking for new evidence, reasons, and arguments that may help settle the 
question. In (A PRIORI) The Answer would say that Ruth and Rudy are permitted either to 
be suspended or to sustain their difference of opinion by holding incompatible hypotheses 
with respect to p and its negation, while still pursuing inquiry into the question of whether 
there is a meaningful distinction between a priori and a posteriori justification. 
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3.2 The Uniform Solution of the Puzzle 
 
The Answer enables us to articulate The Uniform Solution to The Puzzle. It is a solution in that it 
enables us to capture what makes the Conformist Intuition and the Non-Conformist 
Intuition compelling without leading to the puzzling (a)-(d). It is uniform in that it maintains 
that peers ought to comply with the same requirements in both (RESTAURANT) and (A 
PRIORI). Let me articulate both points in more detail. 
First, by requiring peers to re-open the question whether p, The Answer acknowledges 
that peer disagreement carries some epistemic significance. This is what I take to be the deep 
point conveyed by the Conformist Intuition and cases like (RESTAURANT). One might 
worry, however, that this does not amount to a strong vindication of the Conformist 
Intuition. Such a strong vindication would require endorsing the claim that when you 
discover a disagreement with an acknowledged peer, you have evidence that you have made 
a mistake. This is claim (a) of The Puzzle. I believe that The Answer on offer must deny (a). To 
see why, notice that The Answer denies claim (c) of The Puzzle, which says that peers ought to 
change their views.10 Bear in mind that (c) follows from (a) and (b). Since we can regard 
claim (b) as fairly plausible, we must conclude that The Answer denies (c) in virtue of denying 
(a). 
Closer inspection reveals that a rejection of (a) is not only plausible, but also desirable. 
To see why, it must be noticed that claim (a) is bolstered by the widespread assumption that 
in order for peer disagreement to be epistemically significant it has to be regarded as a new 
piece of evidence that one has made a mistake, to be added to the first-order body of 
evidence that bears on the question. However, taking disagreement be an additional piece of 
evidence to the effect that one has made a mistake has proven to have unpalatable 
consequences for both conciliatory and steadfast views (see e.g. Lasonen-Aarnio 2013 and 
Rosenkranz and Schulz 2015). 
Fortunately, authors such as Christensen (2010) Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) and 
Rosenkranz and Schulz (2015) articulate at length a better understanding of the epistemic 
significance of peer disagreement. These authors defend the contention that the epistemic 
significance of disagreement lies in bringing out the possibility that one had mistakenly 
assessed the extension or the probative force of the body of evidence to begin with. That is 
to say, it is not that the discovery of disagreement makes one’s belief no longer supported by 
																																																								
10 This is so provided that “change their views” is to be understood as “revisen their views.” (We have been 
assuming that the narrow notion of revision is the one people are standardly operating with.) 
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the evidence and therefore in need of radical revision. Rather, disagreement is higher-order 
evidence that casts doubt on whether one’s belief was epistemically supported to begin with. 
Under this understanding of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement, it is quite 
natural to claim that peers have most reason to scrutinise their initial epistemic situation by 
re-assessing what the original body of evidence is and how to interpret its probative force. 
Hence, it seems safe to claim that The Answer chimes in well with this plausible interpretation 
of the epistemic significance of disagreement. 
I have suggested that a strong vindication of the Conformist Intuition has in the 
background a problematic account of the epistemic significance of disagreement. Moreover, 
The Answer offers a moderate vindication of what makes the intuition so attractive, namely 
that peer disagreement is somehow epistemically significant, which is compatible with a less 
problematic account of such significance. I therefore contend that there is no explanatory 
loss in rejecting claim (a) of The Puzzle, quite the opposite: we have good reason to reject it. 
The Answer is compatible with a better way of understanding the epistemic significance of 
peer disagreement which does not entail (a). 
The Answer is also able to capture the deep point conveyed by the Non-Conformist 
Intuition. The Answer permits peers to entertain attitudes of hypothesis, rather than requiring 
them to suspend judgement or update their respective degrees of confidence about the 
matter at issue. The Answer thus vindicates the driving thought behind claim (d) of The Puzzle, 
namely that there are disagreement cases – such as (A PRIORI) – in which peers ought not 
change their view. So Rudy and Ruth are entitled to be cognitively inclined toward, 
respectively, the truth and falsity of the proposition that there exists a meaningful distinction 





I have argued that peers ought to respond to their disagreement by re-opening the question 
of the truth of the relevant matter at hand. This requirement is normatively compatible with 
two types of doxastic revision: revising by suspending, and revising by hypothesising. This 
constitutes The Uniform Solution to The Puzzle: peer disagreement is epistemically significant in 
all its manifestations, but acknowledging such epistemic significance does not require peers 
to suspend judgement about the matter at hand or to change their view. The Uniform Solution 
to The Puzzle which The Answer affords does not fully vindicate the Conformist Intuition, 
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since it rejects claim (a) of The Puzzle. This is however done on the basis of a principled 
understanding of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement which chimes in with the 
contention that peers ought to re-open the question whether p. By rejecting claim (a), The 
Uniform Solution also rejects claim (c) of The Puzzle. However, since The Answer acknowledges 
that peer disagreement carries some significance which requires peers to re-open the 
question whether p, The Uniform Solution offers a moderate vindication of the Conformist 
Intuition. Moreover, by permitting peers to retain their respective cognitive inclinations 
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